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JURISDICTION 
Respondents, Salt Lake and Tooele County Defendants, 
agree with the statement of jurisdiction contained in Petition-
ers1 brief. Respondents will not in this brief restate the 
jurisdiction of the Court to hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal by Appellants, Kennecott Corporation, 
Morton Thiokol, Inc., Barrick Resources (USA), Inc., and 
Hercules, Inc., is from a Decision and Partial Summary Judgment 
upholding the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated 
§17-19-15. Said Decision was premised upon the Court's conclu-
sion that Utah Code Annotated, 17-19-15 was a state-wide tax 
enacted by the Utah Legislature to fund the state-wide purpose 
of achieving uniformity and equality of assessment of property 
taxes by establishing a funding mechanism to provide for the 
uniform state-wide administration of the assessment, collection 
and distribution of property taxes. 
The Decision was issued by the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court on April 11, 
1989. (R-291-300.) Summary Judgment, Final Order and 
Certification were entered on August 7, 1989. (R321-324.) 




STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Whether or not it is constitutionally permissible for 
the Utah State Legislature to pass a law to address the state-
wide concern of achieving equality and uniformity of property 
taxation in the State of Utah. 
2. Whether or not a legislatively established uniform, 
equalized statewide tax levy to fund property tax administration 
in each of the 29 counties of Utah is a valid exercise of 
legislative authority in pursuit of a remedy for a state-wide 
problem. 
3. Whether or not the Appellantss have standing to chal-
lenge the effect of the Uniform State-wide Tax Levy upon Salt 
Lake or Tooele County. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INCLUDED 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS; (See Exhibit A.) 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS: (See Exhibit A.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1986, the general legislative session of the Utah 
State Legislature, in response to representatives of local 
governmental entities as well as the state and local school 
boards, enacted into law Section 17-19-15, Utah Code Annotated. 
The statute was passed to address the concern for compliance 
with the constitutional requirement that all tangible property 
be taxed at a uniform and equal rate. Section 17-19-15 estab-
lished an equalized statewide levy to pay for the cost of 
P15:H 
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assessing, collecting and distributing ad valorem property tax 
revenues. 
The statute was first applied in 1987 and again in 
1988. 
Appellants paid their 1988 property taxes under 
protest and thereafter filed a complaint for refund in the 
district court of Salt Lake County claiming the statute to be 
unconstitutional. The county defendants (Respondents herein) 
filed an answer. Plaintiffs (Appellants herein) filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment. (R98-99.) Defendants 
(Respondents herein), filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 
(R270-272). The district court determined that the statute was 
constitutional in all respects and granted summary judgment to 
the Defendants. Appellants appealed to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except for the limited role of the State Tax Commis-
sion in assessing certain multi-county or specifically described 
properties, valuation for ad valorem taxation is accomplished in 
the State of Utah through local county officials in each of the 
twenty-nine counties. 
Historically, the State Legislature and the State Tax 
Commission have played a significant role in all local assess-
ment issues. 
S.B. 151 (Codified into Utah Code Annotated, 
17-19-15) , was passed in the 1986 general session by the Utah 
State Legislature. (R-27-29.) 
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The purpose of the legislation was to provide a 
funding mechanism to address a matter of state-wide concern in 
each of the individual counties to wit: the accurate, equitable 
and fair assessment of locally assessed residential, commercial 
and industrial properties as well as the effective and efficient 
collection and distribution of ad valorem property tax revenues. 
(R-260-262.) 
Prior to the passage of the challenged statute there 
had been seven consecutive years of litigation by railroads 
claiming that local commercial and industrial properties were 
under-assessed. (R-264-269.) 
In each of the previous four years the Utah State Tax 
Commission had issued orders directing certain counties in Utah 
to increase assessment levels and at least five lawsuits had 
been filed by the Utah State Tax Commission against local county 
assessors claiming under-assessment of locally assessed prop-
erties within their respective counties. (R-264-269.) 
While the statute required the State Auditor to set 
forth categories of costs uniform throughout the State to be 
utilized by county governing bodies in budgeting for the cost of 
assessing, collecting and distributing ad valorem tax revenues, 
the final tax rate was to be determined by the Utah State Tax 
Commission from the aggregated budget total for all counties 
established by the State Auditor. However, the setting of the 
county budget, the controlling of costs through the budget 
process and the expenditure of funds was intended to and did 
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remain the responsibility of the county boverning body. 
(R-264-269.) 
The Utah Association of Counties, by formal resolution 
in November of 1987, expressed its support for the provisions of 
S.B. 151 and opposed any attempt to amend or repeal its pro-
visions. In January of 1988 all 29 counties of the State of 
Utah unanimously expressed their support for the provisions of 
S.B. 151 including the revenue sharing provisions contained in 
the Act and again opposed any attempts to repeal or amend its 
provisions. (R-264-269.) 
The Utah State Office of Education, the Utah Asso-
ciation of Counties, the Utah School Boards Association as well 
as the Utah League of Cities and Towns, determined that the 
equalized levy contained in S.B. 151 was a positive solution to 
the problem of payment for assessing and collecting taxes. 
(R-269.) 
The Act has been a positive force in assisting the Tax 
Commission in achieving uniformity and equality of assessments, 
and has operated consistently with state-wide responsibilities 
of the Tax Commission. (Affidavit of R. Hal Hansen, Exhibit C.) 
On June 14, 1988, Appellants filed an amended com-
plaint against Salt Lake and Tooele Counties seeking a refund of 
taxes paid under protest, a declaration that Utah Code Annotated 
Sections 17-19-15 was unconstitutional, and a permanent injunc-
tion against the State Auditor and the Utah State Tax Commis-
sion. (R-53-56.) 
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The Salt Lake and Tooele County Defendants filed an 
answer and thereafter Appellants and Respondents both sought 
summary judgment. After allowing appropriate time for briefing 
by both parties, the Court heard argument and on the 11th of 
April, 198 9, the Court issued its memorandum decision that Utah 
Code Annotated Section 17-19-15 was constitutional in all 
respects. (R-291-300.) Summary Judgment was entered in favor 
of Respondents and against Appellants. (R-351-352.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 17-19-15, Utah Code Annotated was the result 
of several years of efforts on the part of local government, 
local school boards, the Tax Commission and the Utah legislature 
to resolve the statewide concern for equal and uniform valuation 
of property for all ad valorem property taxation. To provide 
the necessary funding to address that statewide concern, the 
legislature adopted a funding mechanism similar to the one 
employed for the State Uniform School Fund. That mechanism was 
a separate equalized statewide tax levy based upon the actual 
budgeted costs of assessing, collecting and distributing proper-
ty tax revenues within each of the 29 counties of the State. 
The funding mechanism employed was a valid exercise of legisla-
tive authority in pursuit of a remedy for a statewide problem. 
The procedures established by Section 17-19-15, Utah Code 
Annotated are consistent with the authority set forth in the 
Utah Constitution for the legislature and the Utah State Tax 
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Commission, The procedures set forth in the challenged statute 
are also in keeping with the interpretative decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court and do not violate any provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States or the State of Utah. 
Appellants and Respondents both submitted that matter 
to the trial court for summary judgment. The overarching issue 
presented by both motions was the constitutionality of Section 
17-19-15, Utah Code Annotated. Since Appellants and Respondents 
had each filed motions for summary judgment, each had concluded 
that the legal issue of the constitutionality of Section 17-19-15 
was ripe for final determination. This Court's decision on that 
issue will, in the judgment of Respondents, be a final disposi-
tion of the entire case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SENATE BILL NO. 151, (CODIFIED AT UTAH CODE 
ANN. §17-19-15) DULY ENACTED BY THE 1986 
LEGISLATURE, IS PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL AS A 
VALID LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT DESIGNED TO 
PROMOTE EFFICIENT STATEWIDE PROPERTY TAX 
ASSESSMENT, COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION. 
The Appellants seek to have this Court find the Act 
violative of various provisions of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed 
judicial restraint in finding any duly enacted legislative 
decision unconstitutional. Enactments must be read in a light 
favoring constitutionality with an effort made to resolve any 
doubts in favor of the statute. This principle was clearly 
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stated in some detail in Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 
197 P.2d 477, 499 (Utah, 1948). 
It is well settled in this state, as else-
where, that the courts will not declare a 
statute unconstitutional unless it clearly and 
manifestly violates some provision of the 
Constitution of the state or of the United 
States. Every presumption must be indulged in 
favor of the constitutionality of an act, and 
every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of 
its validity. The whole burden lies on him 
who denies the constitutionality of a legisla-
tive enactment. If by any fair interpretation 
of the statute the legislation can be upheld, 
it is the duty of this court to sustain it, 
even though judges may view the act as inop-
portune or unwise; and it is not within the 
province of the judiciary to question the 
wisdom of the motives of the Legislature in 
the enactment of the statute. The provision 
in question was regularly passed by the 
Legislature and approved by the governor. The 
presumption should be and is in favor of 
validity. It must be assumed that the legis-
lative department, whose members pledge 
themselves by oath to support the Constitu-
tion, has not lightly disregarded that pledge. 
The Court elaborated upon this theme of presumptive constitution-
ality in Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1979), 
emphatically stating that legislative enactments were presumed 
constitutional and that particular deference should be accorded 
enactments that were primarily economic in nature. In a 19 84 
case the Court affirmed its previous decisions and also stated 
that "the presumption of constitutionality applies with particu-
lar force to tax statutes." Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 
681 P.2d 184, 190-191, (Utah, 1984). It is also presumed that 
all legislative enactments are the result of the considered 
P15:H 
8 
opinions of the state's duly elected and representative law-
makers. To find any statute unconstitutional, the court must 
find that no reasonable reading of the statute permits a finding 
of constitutionality. The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 285 
P.1001, 1004 (Utah, 1930). If any fair reading of the statute 
permits a constitutional interpretation, the Court must uphold 
it. It is against this strong presumption that the statutory 
scheme discussed below must be analyzed. 
POINT II 
A. THE BACKGROUND TO THE ACT AND THE EXTEN-
SIVE HISTORY OF STATE INVOLVEMENT IN AND 
CONTROL OVER THE AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX 
SYSTEM ESTABLISH A STATE PURPOSE IN FUNDING 
AND OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. 
Except for the limited role of the State Tax Commis-
sion in assessing certain multi-county or specifically designat-
ed properties, valuation for ad valorem taxation is accomplished 
in the State of Utah through local county officials in each of 
the twenty-nine counties. To suggest, however, that because 
functions are reposed within the statutory portfolios of locally 
elected officials and financed partially or totally by county 
general fund revenues they are purely local functions, ignores 
the significant historical role which the State Legislature and 
State Tax Commission have played in all local assessment issues. 
Article XIII, Section 11, Constitution of Utah, establishes a 
State Tax Commission and provides specifically that: 
"under such regulations in such cases and 
within such limitations as the Legislature may 
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prescribe it shall review proposed bond 
issues, revise the tax levies of local govern-
mental units, and equalize the assessment and 
valuation of property within the counties." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The same constitutional provision gives the State Tax 
Commission power to regulate and control local County Boards of 
Equalization and local elected officials with respect to taxa-
tion matters. Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210, 1953, as amended, 
grants sweeping control to the Tax Commission over local county 
taxing matters. Specifically, it may "adopt rules and pol-
icies... to govern county boards and officers in the performance 
of any duty relating to assessment, equalization and collection 
of taxes" [§59-1-210(3)], "prescribe the use of forms relating 
to the assessment of property and the equalization of those 
assessments" [§59-1-210(4)], and "administer and supervise the 
tax laws of the state" [§59-1-210(5)]. Additionally it may: 
"exercise general supervision over assessors 
and county boards of equalization and over 
other county officers in the performance of 
their duties relating to the assessment of 
property and collection of taxes so that all 
assessments of property are just and equal, 
according to fair market value, and that the 
tax burden is distributed without favor or 
discrimination" [§59-1-210(7)]. 
It may "confer with, advise and direct county treasur-
ers, assessors and other county officers in matters relating to 
the assessment and equalization of property for taxation and the 
collection of taxes" [§59-1-210(9)]. As part of its 
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investigative responsibility the Commission is charged with the 
power to: 
"investigate and direct the work and methods 
of local assessors and other officials in the 
assessment, equalization, and taxation of 
property, and to ascertain whether the law 
requiring the assessment of all property not 
exempt from taxation, and the collection of 
taxes, have been properly administered and 
enforced." [§59-1-210(19)] . 
Finally, to enforce its complete supervisory control over the 
local property tax process it may "cause complaints to be made 
in the proper court seeking removal from office of assessors, 
auditors, members of county boards and other assessing, taxing, 
or disbursing officers who are guilty of official misconduct or 
neglect of duty" [§59-1-210(12)]. 
This comprehensive grant of regulatory authority and 
state control over all assessment and collection practices 
within the counties of the State is also evidenced by several 
specific statutory enactments relating to the performance of 
those duties. Chapter 2 of Title 59, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended) provides a comprehensive statutory framework with 
regard to time frames, procedures, standards and methods under 
which local assessors, treasurers, auditors, and County Boards 
of Equalization must function. The Legislature and Tax Commis-
sion have, to a large degree, completely assumed control of the 
local administration of the property tax system. 
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Consistent with the Constitutional requirement for the 
fair, equitable and accurate assessment of all property in the 
State (Utah Const. Art. XIII §3), the Tax Commission has been 
constitutionally and statutorily mandated to equalize the 
valuations of the various counties for purposes of guaranteeing 
equitable assessment levels in financing the Uniform School 
Fund. The revenues of that fund are derived to a large degree 
from a uniform statewide tax levy imposed by local school 
districts. To further state equalization and uniformity of 
assessment, the Utah State Legislature, in 1969, established 
comprehensive programs of assessor certification and examination 
and a statewide re-appraisal program with costs to be shared 
between counties and the State Tax Commission. This program was 
designed to provide for re-appraisal of all taxable property in 
each county every five years on a county-by-county basis. The 
Legislature also implemented a program of personal property 
auditing conducted by the State Tax Commission with cost sharing 
by the counties. See generally, Laws of Utah 1969, Chapter 179, 
Section 1 through 6, [Codified as Utah Code Ann. §59-5-106 
through 111 (1953, as amended)]. 
In 1981, the re-appraisal program created in 1969 was 
repealed by the Utah State Legislature, (Laws of Utah 1981, 
Chapter 233, Section 2.) In its place was substituted a compre-
hensive program of sales-assessment ratio studies to be conduct-
ed by the State Tax Commission. The provisions relating to 
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certification of county assessors, education and training 
programs conducted by the Tax Commission, personal property 
audits and assessment-sales ratio studies are currently codified 
at Utah Code Ann. §59-2-701 through 705 (1953, as amended.) 
With respect to the assessment-sales ratio responsibility of the 
State Tax Commission, Utah Code Ann. §59-2-704(2) (1953, as 
amended) provides, in pertinent part, that upon completion of 
the study by the Tax Commission: 
(2) "The commission shall, on or before the 
4th Tuesday of November of each even-numbered 
year, order each county to adjust or factor 
its assessment rates using the most current 
studies so that the assessment rate in each 
county is in accordance with that prescribed 
in Section 59-2-103. The adjustment or 
factoring may include an entire county, 
geographical areas within a county, and 
separate classes of properties. Where signif-
icant value deviations occur, the commission 
shall also order corrective action." 
Accordingly as part of the comprehensive State policy 
with respect to equal and uniform assessments, the Tax Commis-
sion has been given authority to order adjustments to values and 
even order corrective action (re-appraisal) when significant 
value deviations occur. 
Finally, as part of its effort to guarantee accuracy 
of assessment for purposes of equality within the equalized tax 
levy supporting the Uniform School Fund, the Legislature in 19 77 
(Laws of Utah, 1977, Chapter 22, Sections 1 through 4) provided 
that uniform minimum standards for real property plat maps used 
by counties for property tax assessments would be established by 
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a separate committee chaired by a member of the State Tax 
Commission. The statutes provide that all plat maps prepared by 
local elected county recorders and assessors must conform to 
those standards and that the counties would be reimbursed for 
the cost of correcting existing plats. The importance of this 
activity and its relevance to the support of the Uniform School 
Fund were deemed sufficient to justify the enactment of Utah 
Code Ann. §59-5-114, now codified at Utah Code Ann. §59-2-318 
(1952, as amended), which stated: 
Cost of preparation of revised plats are to be 
borne by the Commission and appropriated from 
the Uniform School Fund to the Property Tax 
Division of the Commission for distribution to 
the various counties...(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Legislature clearly established that equali-
ty of assessment between counties was of such statewide concern 
that an equalized statewide levy should be used to pay for the 
services. This financing mechanism is identical to that chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs in the instant case. 
The Act presented for the court's review is the 
culmination of five years of concerted legislative activity and 
litigation by cities, school districts and counties. See 
generally Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 
(Utah 1983), and Boards of Education of Granite, Murray and Salt 
Lake School Districts v. Salt Lake County Commission, et al., 
749 P.2d 1264 (Utah, 1988.) In an attempt to resolve and/or 
eliminate continuing litigation over the apportionment of the 
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costs of assessing, collecting and distributing property taxes, 
the statewide financing mechanism currently under attack in the 
instant case was duly enacted by the 1986 Utah State Legislature 
as S.B. 151. The method of financing an effective and economic 
statewide system of property tax assessment, collection and 
distribution was closely modeled on the financing mechanism for 
the State supported minimum school program (Uniform School 
Fund). See Utah Code Ann. §53-7-1 <st seq. (1953, as amended.) 
Under the uniform statewide tax administration levy, 
local county governing bodies establish budgets for assessing, 
collecting and distributing property taxes, categorize those 
costs in the uniform budgeting categories adopted by rule by the 
State Auditor, and impose as a local levy a uniform statewide 
tax rate sufficient to finance the aggregated budgets submitted 
by the 29 counties. If, in any county, the levy for tax admin-
istration purposes generates an amount in excess of the amount 
budgeted by the Board of County Commissioners for that county, 
the excess funds transmitted to the State Treasurer for re-dis-
tribution to counties like Tooele County where the tax rate was 
insufficient to generate the amount required for the tax admin-
istration system. County commissions are free to budget and 
expend whatever funds they deem necessary to accomplish the 
operation of the property tax administration system. In the 
event the expenditures are not within one of the uniform cat-
egories adopted and approved by the State Auditor, the County 
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governing body retains the authority to provide for the expendi-
ture from other county revenues. 
The utilization of an equalized statewide levy ap-
proved during the 1986 general legislative session was a de-
viation from the previous authority of each county to levy a 
separate tax for the cost of assessing, collecting and dis-
tributing property taxes. The equalized levy was in specific 
recognition of the significant differences in property tax 
valuation throughout the 29 counties. Many counties possess 
insufficient tax base to fully fund the cost of property tax 
assessment, collection and distribution with the tax rate 
authorized by the Legislature for that purpose. The utilization 
of an equalized tax rate was an attempt to minimize the negative 
impact of this disparity in taxing capability. As a solution it 
received the unanimous support of the cities, counties and 
school districts which are the three major groups previously 
involved in litigation over these same issues. (See Exhibit B, 
Affidavit of Brent Gardner, R-264-269.) 
It is against this background that the present Act, 
codified as Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15 (1953, as amended), must be 
analyzed. The present Act is the Legislature's considered 
solution to the need for an equalized, efficient mechanism to 
pay for the costs of a statewide property tax assessment, 
collection and distribution system. 
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Appellants1 challenges to the Act rely extensively on 
several Utah Supreme Court decisions issued between 1901 and 
1936. State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66).1061 (1901); State 
v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P.337 (1904); Bailey v. VanDyke, 66 
Utah 184, 240 P.242 (1925); The Best Foods v. Christensen, 285 
P.1001 (Utah 1930); Smith v. Carbon County, 63 P.2d 259 (Utah 
1936). These early cases are distinguishable from the case at 
bar both factually and legally. Additionally, several recent 
cases have significantly diminished the relevance of the earlier 
authority in assessing the constitutionality of funding mecha-
nisms authorized by the Legislature as in the public interest— 
especially where matters of statewide concern are involved. 
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); Salt 
Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 
1979); U.T.F.C. V. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986); City of 
West Jordan, et al. v. Utah State Retirement Board, et al, 9 8 
Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah, 1988). See also A. Lynn Jr., "Finan-
cing Modernized and Unmodernized Local Government in the Age of 
Aquarius," 1971 UTAH L.REV.30. Under this latter line of cases, 
the funding mechanism established by the Act is clearly consti-
tutional. Finally, the clear distinctions between the statutory 
mechanism set out in the Act and those described as defective in 
earlier cases support validation even under the earlier strict 
construction of Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5. 
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Three years later, the Court again considered the 
application of Article XIII Section 5 to a legislative act. In 
State v. Eldredge, 76 P.337 (Utah 1904), the Legislature au-
thorized the State Board of Equalization to assess or value 
certain property situated wholly within one county. This duty 
was constitutionally vested in county officials. That portion 
of the statute authorizing state assessment or valuation of 
property situated or operated wholly within one county was 
severed and voided. No fair reading permitted upholding that 
portion in light of the specific Constitutional limitation of 
Utah Const. Art. XIII, §11. It should be noted that the consti-
tutional provision relied upon by the Court has been amended 
three times since the 1904 decision. The constitutional sepa-
ration of state and local functions has been abolished and the 
clear supervisory control of the State Tax Commission has been 
reinforced. In fact, much of the litany of potential abuse 
cited by the Eldredge Court is now constitutionally sanctioned 
by express language. Eldredge thus provides little guidance to 
this Court in determining questions of state purpose and state 
taxation. In the case at hand, the Act can be read fairly 
without finding clear violations of Article XIII, Section 5 or 
Article XIII, Section 11. The duties and functions of each 
public official set forth in the Act come within and are consis-
tent with the respective statutorily permitted duties for each 
such public position. (See, Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210, general 
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Appellants also seek support in Smith v. Carbon 
County, 63 P. 2d 259 (Utah 1936.) The Act under review by the 
Smith Court involved the imposition by county clerks of probate 
fees graduated according to the size of the estate. At the 
outset it must be noted that Smith was not an Article XIII, §5 
case. The only reference to that provision is a passing one—in 
dicta. The case largely revolved around whether the probate 
charge was a "fee" or a "tax." The Court concluded that it was 
a "tax" which, because of its graduated nature, violated the 
uniform and equal provisions. As the Article XIII §5 issues 
were not briefed the Court didnft address them. Thus the case 
is of little support to the Appellants since there is clear 
authority for sustaining the power of the State to impose 
burdens on local government and require the imposition of taxes 
to pay for them. The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 285 
P.1001-1004 (Utah 1930.) 
Finally, Appellant relies on The Best Foods, Inc. v. 
Christensen, 285 P.1001 (Utah 1930) for the proposition that the 
current Act intrudes impermissibly into the right of local 
self-government. In Best Foods, a legislative requirement that 
local officials grant and sell permits prior to allowing commer-
cial trade of oleomargarine was upheld even though the local 
governments were directed to charge and keep the administrative 
fees allowed. While the Court stated that the "very essence of 
local self-government," was the power of municipalities to 
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was unconstitutional. Finding the act to have a statewide 
purpose, the facial appearance of local benefits accruing to an 
agency controlled by a Board of Directors composed of the Salt 
Lake City Council occurring at the instance of a legislative act 
was not controlling. To respond to a statewide concern, blight-
ed areas, "the law is well settled that in exercising the powers 
of the state the Legislature may require the revenue of a 
municipality, raised by taxation, to be applied to uses other 
than that for which the taxes were levied." _ld. at 504. 
The holding in Tribe is important to the present case 
because it properly recognizes the Legislature's authority to 
recognize a legitimate statewide purpose (i.e., respectively, to 
rid localities on a statewide basis of blighted areas, Tribe; 
and create an efficient statewide property tax assessment, 
collection and distribution mechanism, and the concomitant 
authority to require imposition of a tax for or the diversion of 
local revenue to that identified specific statewide purpose. 
Following Tribe, in Salt Lake County v. Murray City 
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979) , this Court again 
upheld the Utah Neighborhood Redevelopment Act and found the 
diversion of locally assessed taxes to the Murray City project's 
use as a proper exercise of the state's power to tax for the 
benefit of the public at large. The Salt Lake County Court took 
the opportunity to reaffirm its earlier conclusions in Tribe. 
The Legislature is empowered to redirect the tax revenues of 
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Due respect for the legislative prerogative in 
law making requires that the judiciary not 
interfere with enactments of the Legislature 
where disagreement is founded only on policy 
considerations and the legislative scheme 




Utah Technology Finance Corp, v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 412 
(Utah 1986), citing Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979). 
Continuing in this narrative, the UTFC Court, citing with favor 
its opinion in Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 
(Utah 1984) states: 
[A]cts of the Legislature are presumed consti-
tutional, especially when dealing with econom-
ic matters based on factual assumptions. It 
is only when a legislative determination of 
public purpose is so clearly in error as to be 
capricious and arbitrary that the judiciary 
should upset it. Allen v. Tooele, supra. 
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 
723 P.2d 406, 412-413 (Utah 1986). 
And finally, the Court described the nature of public purpose. 
What is public purpose varies and changes with 
the times. In 1890, it was held that the 
purchasing and operating of an electrical 
distribution system to supply electricity to 
homes was not a public purpose. Maudlin v. 
City Council of Greenville, 33 S.C. 1, 11 S.E. 
434 (1890) . In contrast, in the past twelve 
years we have found public purpose in indus-
trial development by a county, Allen v. Tooele 
County, supra; eradication of urban blight by 
a quasi-municipal corporation, Tribe v. Salt 
Lake City; and the providing of funds for low-
and moderate-income housing by a state agency. 
Utah Housing Finance v. Smart, supra. We 
cannot say in the face of those precedents 
that the stimulation of Utah's economy and the 
creation of employment is not a legitimate 
public purpose. It is closely related to 
industrial development and not different in 
kind. Whatever our private views on the 
matter might be, we must concede that the 
Legislature's determination that a public 
benefit would result was within its latitude. 
Id. at 413. 
The Appellants, at great length, reiterate that the 
uniform levy to defray the costs of collecting and assessing 
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There, as in the instant case, "the state, ...simply calls upon 
its agencies, the counties, and the cities to assist in dis-
charging a public duty which in no way affects local self-
government." Id. at 5 64. Counties, as legal subdivisions of 
the State act as instrumentalities of the State in effecting 
State purposes. The State uses the County as its agent in the 
discharge of the State's functions and duties. Specific exam-
ples of this role are found throughout Title 17, Utah Code 
Annotated. Sheriffs must serve all process when the State is a 
party. §17-22-26, Utah Code Anno. (1953 as amended.) County 
Attorneys must conduct on behalf of the State all prosecutions 
for public offenses within counties. They must attend to all 
legal business required by the Attorney General, without charge, 
when the interests of the State are involved. §17-17-1, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953 as amended.) County Assessors, in cooperation 
with and under the supervision of the State Tax Commission, must 
perform all the duties mandated by Tax Commission Rule, the 
Legislature or the Constitution. Utah Const., Art. XIII, §11, 
and §17-17-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended.) Based upon this 
mix of delegated State responsibility and the County quasi-
municipal police powers over purely local matters, Appellants 
err in suggesting an interpretation of Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5 
that ignores these differences. The State of Utah has a long 
history of involvement in and supervision over property tax 
assessment and collection matters. (See Point 11(A) of 
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"[The] relative abilities of the state 
and municipal governments to perform the 
function, the degree to which the performance 
of the function affects the interests of those 
beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and 
the extent to which the legislation under 
attack will intrude upon the ability of the 
people within the municipality to control 
through their elected officials the substan-
tive policies that affect them uniquely." 
In the present case, the funding mechanism adopted by 
the Legislature specifically recognized and addressed the 
disparity in tax base between the various counties of the state. 
Just as with public education and the Uniform School Fund, many 
of the counties of the state lack the ability to fund wholly 
from their own revenues efficient and modernized property tax 
assessment and collection systems. By providing a uniform 
state-wide tax rate the ability to perform the constitutionally 
mandated responsibilities was extended to all counties, not just 
those with rich tax bases. Failure of counties to perform those 
functions affects not just taxpayers within the non-performing 
county, but all other taxpayers in the state through their 
contribution to the Uniform School Fund and the equalized 
funding of public education. Little is served in terms of 
meeting the constitutional mandate of equality of uniformity and 
assessment if only those counties which have adequate tax bases 
are properly assessed. Finally, the question must be resolved 
as to whether the statutory funding scheme "intrudes upon the 
ability of the people within the county to control through their 
elected officials the substantive policies that affect them 
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While the foregoing is in the context of an Art. VI, 
§2 8 discussion, the elements of municipal functions under that 
provision and "local purposes" under Art. XIII, §5 are closely 
intertwined. The balancing test established by the Court for 
determining whether something is "a municipal function" is 
equally applicable in determining whether an activity is a 
"local purpose." In each case the pervasive pattern of state 
activity and control over the assessment, collection and dis-
tribution of property taxes renders those functions as something 
more than "local purposes" or "municipal functions." They are 
not "substantive policies that affect them (the County) unique-
ly." West Jordan, Id. at 40. 
It is settled law in this State, as in all juris-
dictions throughout the Country, that the Legislature possesses 
the authority to require local governments to impose taxes or 
spend funds raised by taxes to effect state-wide purposes. 
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499, 504 (Utah 
1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 
1339, 1343 (Utah 1979). Appellants choose to ignore this 
mandatory aspect of Tribe and Salt Lake County. Also ignored is 
the simple reality that counties annually budget, levy, and 
expend millions of dollars in the performance of duties mandated 
by the State Legislature as part of comprehensive Legislative 
schemes for effecting State policy. State offenses are pros-
ecuted, state Courts are supported, state statute violators are 
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incarcerated, and state standards for assessing and collecting 
property taxes are complied with, all by County officials, all 
with local property tax dollars, and all pursuant to comprehen-
sive State mandated policies. As noted in a leading treatise on 
County law," . . . Everywhere, even in states having the aforemen-
tioned constitutional clause, (referring to a constitutional 
provision identical to Article XIII, §5 of the Utah Constitu-
tion) , it is agreed that state legislatures can impose taxes 
upon counties for state purposes and can compel counties to 
spend for such purposes even though taxation will be required." 
(Emphasis supplied.) Antieau, Local Governmental Law, §41.07. 
Additionally, uniform and equitable property tax 
assessment, collection and distribution has been a matter of 
general public concern since statehood. Equal and uniform 
assessment is required by the Constitution. The state has borne 
the cost of statewide reappraisal programs. Equalized levies 
have paid for the development of local property assessment plat 
maps. The timing, sequencing, and performance of tax adminis-
tration duties by County officials are all subject to constitu-
tional, statutory, and administrative control by the state. To 
suggest that the current Act violates local self-government or 
constitutes legislative imposition of a tax for local purposes 
ignores both history and reality. The Act is in furtherance of 
resolving a matter of statewide concern and as such is constitu-
tional under all the cases which have interpreted Utah Const. 
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Art. XIII, §5. In conclusion, the Appellants1 claims cannot 
overcome the presumption of constitutionality and the clear 
presence of a comprehensive state purpose. 
POINT III 
THE FUNDING MECHANISM CREATED BY THE ACT DOES 
NOT VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. XIII, §5. 
Appellants contend that the revenue redistribution 
aspect of the funding mechanism established by the Act violates 
Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5, by mandating revenue sharing between 
the counties. Appellants1 argument is that the revenue sharing 
allowed under that constitutional provision must be a voluntary 
act engaged in by counties and may not be imposed upon counties 
by the Legislature. As discussed above, the revenue redistribu-
tion formula set out in the Act is not an anomaly under Utah 
law. It is similar in its operation to that created by the 
Legislature for funding the mandated minimum school program [see 
Utah Code Ann. §53-7-1 et seq. (1953, as amended)], or dis-
tributing local sales and use tax revenue [see Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-20, et seq. (1953, as amended)]. As part of a comprehen-
sive statewide approach to funding the property tax adminis-
tration system the revenue redistribution aspects of the Act are 
clearly consistent with those approved by the Court in Tribe v. 
Salt Lake City Corp. , 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975) and Salt Lake 
County v. Murray Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979). In 
each of those cases taxes properly levied by taxing entities 
within Salt Lake County were partially diverted to a 
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redevelopment agency for the purpose of alleviating the state-
wide problem of blighted areas. In the present case, counties 
in which proceeds in excess of the budgeted amounts are gen-
erated by the uniform statewide tax administration levy have 
those excess funds diverted to other counties in furtherance of 
funding programs leading to statewide uniformity of assessment 
and valuation. Such a program does not necessarily constitute 
revenue sharing between the counties, but merely a statewide 
funding approach to a matter of statewide concern. Accordingly, 
Utah Const, art. XIII §5 is irrelevant to the discussion. 
Even assuming arguendo that the funding mechanism 
prescribed by the Act constitutes revenue sharing between the 
counties, Appellants1 challenge to the Act on that basis must 
fail for several reasons. First, if the Act only allows volun-
tary revenue sharing, the aggrieved parties are not the plain-
tiffs but those counties which object to the revenue sharing. 
Appellants lack standing to assert the claims on behalf of the 
counties. Second, the clear factual evidence as set out in the 
Affidavit of Mr. Gardner and the joint statement of the Utah 
Association of Counties, Utah League of Cities and Towns and 
Utah School Boards Association, establishes that the Act was 
supported by the counties at the time of its passage. R-
264-269. Subsequently the Utah Association of Counties, by 
resolution of all its membership, or the executive committee 
authorized to speak for it, has, on two separate occasions 
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specifically endorsed S.B. 151 including the funding mechanism 
established thereunder• Finally, the Utah Association of County 
Commissioners and County Councils representing the governing 
bodies of all 29 counties of the State has unanimously endorsed 
the Act with its revenue sharing provisions and opposed any 
attempt to amend or repeal it. To assert that the revenue 
sharing portions of the Act are contrary to the wishes of the 
counties ignores reality• Third, assuming further that the 
financing mechanism does constitute involuntary revenue sharing, 
Utah Const. Art. XIII §5, is silent on the question of whether 
the State may re-distribute revenue when a statewide purpose is 
involved. The amendment of Utah Const. Art. XIII §5 was to 
allow voluntary horizontal revenue sharing. The Amendment 
allows local governments to voluntarily share their revenues. 
It is silent as to whether the legislature is prohibited from 
diverting or reallocating revenues between local subdivisions. 
The real question surrounding the 1983 amendment is whether 
anywhere in that amendment exists a prohibition against the 
Legislature imposing a tax or requiring revenue sharing for a 
state purpose. Respondents submit there is not. The amendment 
is silent on that issue and Appellants should not be allowed to 
create from whole cloth a non-existent Constitutional prohibi-
tion. Barring such a constitutional prohibition against legis-
lative action, Utah Const. Art. VI §1 clearly vests in the 
Legislature of the State of Utah all authority to legislate on 
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matters of statewide concern. Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 
et al., 57 P.l, 5 (Utah 1899); State ex rel. Nicholes v. Cherry, 
Judge, 60 P. 1103 (Utah 1900); Lehi City v. Meilinq, 48 P.2d 
530, 534, 535 (Utah 1935) . 
In summary, Appellants' Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5 
challenge to the Act as "involuntary revenue sharing" must fail. 
Appellants lack standing to challenge a provision that may only 
be challenged by the affected governmental entities to wit, the 
counties and, second, the record adequately supports that the 
revenue sharing of the Act is fully supported and endorsed by 
all 29 counties. 
Simply stated, Utah Const. Art. XIII §5 does not 
prohibit the diversion of local revenues to effect a statewide 
purpose (Tribe and Salt Lake County, supra.). Unless prohibited 
by the Constitution, the power to legislate on matters of State 
concern is vested in the Legislature. Utah Const. Art. VI §1. 
The 1983 amendment to Utah Const. Art. XIII §5, allowing volun-
tary revenue sharing between local governments is silent and 
does not specifically prohibit the State from creating funding 
mechanisms, even including horizontal revenue sharing, when a 
statewide purpose is involved. Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. 
§17-19-15, is a legitimate exercise of the reserved power of the 
Legislature found in Utah Const. Art. VI §1 and is not prohibit-




APPELLANTS LACK STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT. 
Article XIII, §5 analysis is ultimately not only a 
legal analysis of the specific provisions of a challenged act, 
but also a philosophical analysis of the fundamental inter-rela-
tionships between local and state governments. Article XIII, §5 
is predicated upon the assumption that remote state officials 
should not force local elected officials to levy taxes for what 
state officials might think are necessary local functions. It 
is a constitutional principle which speaks of co-existence, a 
separation of responsibility and of direct accountability 
between local elected officials and their constituents for 
purely local decisions. The thrust of the Appellants1 claims is 
that the Act violates Art. XIII, §5 by creating too great an 
intrusion by the State into purely local affairs. As the 
keystone of Art. XIII, §5 is this inter-governmental relation-
ship, Respondents respectfully submit that Appellants lack 
standing to assert the Art. XIII, §5 challenges. The only 
proper parties are the counties themselves and their elected 
officials. Respondents, Salt Lake and Tooele Counties, volun-
tarily budgeted in accordance with the Act and imposed the tax 
levy authorized thereunder. No challenge was made by Salt Lake 
and Tooele Counties or any of the 29 counties to the funding 
mechanism. Appellants stand in the position of any other 
taxpayer with respect to this issue. Their benefits and burdens 
and the impact of the Act upon them are indistinguishable from 
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the benefits, burdens or impacts felt by any other taxpayer. 
This Court in Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah, 1983) 
described a three part analysis appropriate to the determination 
of standing. The first of those elements is a consideration of 
the traditional standing requirements. Has the appellant 
suffered a real and distinct injury caused by the governmental 
action on which the Appellant bases his claim? Mere allegations 
of adverse impact are insufficient. In truth, under the Act the 
Appellant paid less in Tooele County for the costs of assessing 
and collecting property taxes than if Tooele County had been 
obligated to rely solely on its own tax base. Respondents 
submit that for purposes of Art. XIII, §5 analysis the impact of 
the Act on the relative sovereignty and inter-relationships of 
local and state governments are only on those governments and 
are properly litigatable only by them. Taxpayers suffer none of 
those direct impacts. Appellants are not entities whose sover-
eignty is abridged by the action of the Legislature. The 
Legislature has merely, in its discretion, identified certain 
statewide public policy concerns, placed the obligations for 
those functions upon local government, and provided a funding 
mechanism to compensate for the costs of the program. The 
Appellants1 lack of involvement in that inter-relationship or 
the issue of relative sovereignty precludes them from obtaining 
standing under the traditional tests. 
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The second element of the Jenkins test was the consid-
eration of whether there are potential plaintiffs with a greater 
interest in the outcome who could more adequately pursue the 
issue. Plaintiffs, such as the Appellants, do not obtain 
standing merely because more appropriate plaintiffs are absent. 
It is clear from the analysis of the Art. XIII, §5 consid-
erations that the only appropriate parties are the counties or 
their elected officials. The Appellants may not bootstrap 
themselves into their position merely by asserting their ab-
sence. 
Finally, in Jenkins, the Court turned to the question 
of whether "the issues raised by the plaintiff are of sufficient 
public importance in and of themselves to grant him standing." 
Id. As taxpayers, the Appellants are no different than any 
other member of society. Their personal interest in the Art. 
XIII, §5 issue of relative sovereignty and independence of state 
and local governments is remote. The doctrine of "great public 
interest and societal impact" should not be applied. 
In summary, the Respondents assert that the Appellants 
lack standing to raise the constitutional questions framed in 
the Art. XIII, §5 analysis. Questions of the balance between 
state and local autonomy, the ability of the State to mandate 
functions in furtherance of State purposes and the requirement 
of providing funding to support those services are appropriately 
raised only by the local governments affected. The Appellants1 
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interests are too remote and more appropriate plaintiffs exist. 
They suffer none of the palpable injury which would tradition-
ally give rise to standing. Accordingly, standing should be 
denied and the judgment of the trial court sustained. 
VI. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Senate Bill 151 was a result of several years of 
county legislative efforts in pursuit of a solution to the 
problem of financing property tax administration in each of the 
29 counties of the State. Its specific provisions were sought 
by the counties, endorsed by the counties and Tax Commission and 
remain supported by the counties and Tax Commission. It allows 
county officials to continue to perform their statutorily 
designated responsibilities; Boards of County Commissioners 
retain control over budgets and expenditures, they have the 
authority to expend any funds they deem necessary, not only 
through the proceeds of the Uniform Tax Administration levy but 
through such other general fund revenue sources as they possess. 
No county officials1 responsibilities are impaired by the 
statute and, accordingly, the intrusion of the Act into local 
government affairs is minimal. The utilization of the funding 
mechanism established by the Legislature (a uniform equalized 
statewide levy) is a valid exercise of legislative authority in 
pursuit of a remedy for a statewide problem. Since statehood, 
the Legislature and State Tax Commission have been integrally 
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involved in the operation of the property tax assessment, 
collection and distribution systems in each county of the State. 
The State has utilized proceeds from the Uniform School Fund (an 
uniform equalized statewide levy) to compensate county officials 
for the preparation of real property tax maps. The State has 
utilized general fund revenues to pay its share of the costs of 
the property tax system. Additionally, the Legislature has 
vested in the State Tax Commission the authority, in pursuit of 
statewide equalization and uniformity of valuation, to direct 
adjustment of local values or even re-appraisal of local prop-
erties. To suggest that the tax levy established by the Act is 
not a funding mechanism in furtherance of the matter of state-
wide concern ignores both historical and current reality. Under 
Utah Const. Art. XIII, Section 5 as interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P. 2d 499 
(Utah 1975) , and Salt Lake County v. Murray Redevelopment 
Agency, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979), the funding mechanism estab-
lished by the Act now under review is a permissible extension of 
legislative authority in a matter of statewide concern. It is 
not a legislative imposition of the local tax for a purely local 
purpose. 
In conclusion, the funding mechanism and budgeting 
mechanism are analogous to other funding mechanisms found in 
Utah law. It is directly analogous to the Uniform School Fund 
levy. Additionally the Act intrudes no further into local 
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government responsibilities than any other act previously 
adopted by the Legislature delineating the structure and opera-
tion of the property tax system by local elected officials. 
As such the Act should be sustained and the ruling of 
the trial court granting partial summary judgment to Respondents 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 7th day of February, 
1990. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
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KARL HENDRICKSON 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
BILL THOMAS PETERS 
Special Deputy Salt Lake County 
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RONALD ELTON 
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185 South State Street, Suite 700 
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Ralph Finlayson, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 




CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INCLUDED 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS; 
Article VI, Section 1(1) of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The Legislative power of the State shall be vested: 
1. In a Senate and House of Representatives which shall 
be designated the Legislature of the State of Utah. 
Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution in part 
provides: 
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under 
the laws of the United States, or under this Constitution, 
shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to 
its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. 
Article XIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and 
equal rate of assessment on all tangible property in the 
state, according to its value in money, except as otherwise 
provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature 
shall prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a 
just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every 
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the 
value of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that 
the Legislature may determine the manner and extent of 
taxing livestock. 
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of 
any county, city, town or other municipal corporation, but 
may, by law, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, 
respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all 
purposes of such corporation. Notwithstanding anything to 
the contrary contained in this Constitution, political 
subdivisions may share their tax and other revenues with 
other political subdivisions as provided by statute. 
Article XIII, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
There shall be a State Tax Commission consisting of four 
members, not more than two of whom shall belong to the same 
political party. The members of the Commission shall be 
appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent of the 
State, for such terms of office as may be provided by law. 
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The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise the 
tax laws of the State, It shall assess mines and public 
utilities and adjust and equalize the valuation and assess-
ment of property among the several counties. It shall have 
such other powers of original assessment as the Legislature 
may provide. Under such regulations in such cases and 
within such limitations as the Legislature may prescribe, 
it shall review proposed bond issues, revise the tax levies 
of local governmental units, and equalize the assessment 
and valuation of property within the counties. The duties 
imposed upon the State Board of Equalization by the Consti-
tution and Laws of the State shall be performed by the 
State Tax Commission. 
In each county of this State there shall be a County 
Board of Equalization consisting of the Board of County 
Commissioners of said county. The County Boards of Equal-
ization shall adjust and equalize the valuation and assess-
ment of the real and personal property within their respec-
tive counties, subject to such regulation and control by 
the State Tax Commission as may be prescribed by law. The 
State Tax Commission and the County Boards of Equalization 
shall each have such other powers as may be prescribed by 
the Legislature. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS: 
The Statute that is the subject of this controversy is 
Utah Code Annotated Section 17-19-15 which provides: 
(1) To promote appraisal and equalization of property 
values and effective collection and distribution of proper-
ty tax proceeds, the county governing body of each county 
shall annually separately budget for all costs incurred in 
the assessment, collection, and distribution of property 
taxes and related appraisal programs and submit those 
budgets to the state auditor for review. 
(2) The state auditor shall establish, by rule, categories 
of allowable costs and shall certify submitted budgets for 
compliance with approved categories. 
(3) Upon review and certification by the state auditor, 
the aggregated statewide costs shall be transmitted to the 
State Tax Commission for determination of a mandatory 
statewide tax rate sufficient to meet those expenditures. 
By June 8 of each year the tax commission shall certify the 
rate to each county auditor for inclusion upon the tax 
notice as a separately listed and identified local levy. 
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(4) The tax rate may not exceed a maximum of .0005 per 
dollar of taxable value of taxable property except for: 
(a) mandated or formally adopted reappraisal programs 
conforming to tax commission rules; or (b) actions required 
to meet legislative, judicial, or administrative orders. 
Taxes levied for this purpose may not be included in 
determining the maximum allowable levy for the county or 
any other taxing district. 
(5) In the initial year that the levy adopted under this 
section is effective, each taxing district within counties 
which had not previously levied separate assessing, col-
lecting, and distributing levies, shall reduce its property 
tax levy by an amount equal to that paid by the taxing 
district in the previous year for the cost of assessing, 
collecting, and distributing taxes. 
(6) Revenues received by each county from the levy au-
thorized by this section in excess of the amount set out in 
the certified budget shall be transmitted to the state 
treasurer for equalization and distribution to the counties 
in accordance with the certified budgets. Any revenue 
excess resulting from an increase in collection rates upon 
final settlement shall be deposited by the state treasurer 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
ss. 
L. Brent Gardner, being first duly sworn upon his 
oath, and having personal knowledge of the following, deposes 
and testifies as follows: 
1. That I am the Executive Director of the Utah Asso-
ciation of Counties. 
2. That I have been employed by the Utah Association of 
Counties in that and other capacities since 1976. 
3. That among my principle duties on behalf of the Utah 
Association of Counties is working with counties on property tax 
assessment, collection and distribution matters, and drafting, 
negotiating and representing counties before the Utah State 
Legislature on issues relating to ad valorem tax matters. 
4. That in my capacity with the Utah Association of 
Counties and because of my duties for the Utah Association of 
Counties I am familiar with the subject matter of this litiga-
tion, in particular S.B. 151 (Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15, 1953 as 
amended), prior legislative enactments relating to the assess-
ment of property, and the collection and distribution of ad 
valorem property taxes. 
5. I am familiar with the re-appraisal efforts which have 
been undertaken to meet the needs of the 29 counties of the 
State of Utah. 
6. That I was directly involved in drafting S.B. 151 and 
negotiation and lobbying its passage. 
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7. That S.B. 151 was a compromise measure between cities, 
counties and school districts in the State of Utah over the 
allocation of income derived from the investment of ad valorem 
property tax revenues and the expenses related to property 
assessment and tax collection in the 29 counties of the State. 
8. That S.B. 151 provided a funding mechanism to address 
a matter of statewide concern in each of the individual counties 
to wit: the accurate, equitable and fair assessment of locally 
assessed residential, commercial and industrial properties and 
the effective, efficient collection of ad valorem property tax 
revenues. 
9. That I was personally aware that local assessment 
levels had been challenged as inadequate in 7 consecutive years 
of litigation by railroads wherein it was alleged that local 
commercial and industrial properties were under-assessed; that 
the State Tax Commission had issued orders to counties directing 
them to increase assessment levels in the previous 4 years; and 
that at least five lawsuits had been filed by the State Tax 
Commission against local County Assessors alleging under-assess-
ment of locally assessed properties within their respective 
counties. 
10. That as a result of my role in negotiating and draft-
ing S.B. 151, I am familiar with the duties assigned the State 
Auditor and State Tax Commission. 
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11. That the role assigned to the State Auditor was to set 
forth categories of costs uniform throughout the State to be 
utilized by County Commissions or councils in budgeting for the 
costs of assessing properties and collecting and distributing ad 
valorem tax revenues. 
12. That upon receipt of the county budgets broken into 
the uniform categories, the State Auditor was to aggregate the 
totals and submit that figure to the State Tax Commission which, 
upon determination of the statewide assessed valuation, was to 
calculate a tax rate sufficient to fund the aggregated budget 
totals. 
13. Setting budgets, controlling costs through the budget-
ing process and expending funds was intended to and does remain 
the responsibility of The Board of County Commissioners or 
County Council. 
14. That the Utah Association of Counties, by formally 
adopted resolution, in November 19 87, expressed support for the 
provisions of S.B. 151 and opposed any attempt to amend or 
repeal its provisions. 
15. On or about January 15, 1988, the Utah Association of 
County Commissioners and County Councils representing all 29 
counties of the State of Utah unanimously expressed support for 
the provisions of S.B. 151 including the revenue sharing pro-
visions of the Act and opposition to any attempts to repeal or 
amend the provisions thereof. 
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16. That the attached letter dated February 24, 1986, was 
signed by Kennith L. Dallinga, President of the Utah Association 
of Counties, who signed said statement in behalf of the Utah 
Association of Counties. 
17. That the attached letter is a part of the official 
business records of the Utah Association of Counties kept in the 
ordinary course of business of said association. 
18. That it is the ordinary course of business in the Utah 
Association of Counties to keep such records. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this /S day of ^^^/JP^U^LJ^ 1988. 
L. BRENT GARDNER" - Affiant 
Utah Association of Counties 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / 3 ^ day of 
^Alsj&ti yyiJjL^ 
J 
1988, personally appeared before me L. 
BRENT GARDNER, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
^f^ccZ'b 7>r ^Z-^JC X^L ->-V^ 
My Commission Expires 
NOTARY PUBLIC
 / J 
R e s i d i n g a t : 7r<j-<tf \] 
BPH:K 
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UTAH STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
UTAH STATE BOARD FOR VOCATIONAL EDUCATION 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
M Richard Maxfieid 
Chairman 
Darlene C Hutchison 
Vice Chairman 
Linn C Baker 
Neola Brown 
Keith T Checketts 
Donald G Christensen 
Ruth Hardy Funk 
Valerie J Kelson 
Margaret R Nelson Bernarr S. Furse 
State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction 
February 24, 1986 
Honorable Representative Ted Lewis 
Utah State House of Representative-
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 8 4 1 H 
Dear Representative Lewis: 
S.B. 151, amended to provide for an equalized state levy, 
represents a positive solution to the problem of payment for 
assessing and collecting taxes. We support the concept and 
urge the passage of S.B. 151. 
Sincerely yours, 
2 ^ ^ < A K ^ - -
UTAH STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION 
><-
JJTAH ASSOCIATION ^ E - e e w T I E S 
UTAH SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION 
lXto.1 ) 1 
UTAH LEAGUE 0, 
/ d t t 
ES 6 TOWNS 
250 East 500 South • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 • Telephone: (801) 533-5431 
EXHIBIT C 
i j 
DAVID E. YOCOM - #A3581 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
KARL HENDRICKSON - #A146 4 
Deputv Salt Lake County Attorney 
RONALD ELTON - #A0985 
Tooele County Attorney 
BILL THOMAS PETERS - A25 74 
Special Deputy Salt Lake County and T 
Attorneys for Defendants 
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8 644 
f U E0!H C U M 5 OWCS 
toW 4 3TPM' 
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, MORTON 
THIOKOL, INC., BARRICK RESOURCES 




THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
R. HAL HANSEN, Chairman of the 
Utah State Tax Commission 
ROGER 0. TEW, Utah State Tax 
Commissioner, JOE B. PACHECO, 
Utah State Tax Commissioner, 
G. BLAINE DAVIS, Utah State 
Tax Commissioner, TOM L. ALLEN, 
Utah State Auditor, EDWARD T. 
ALTER, Utah State Treasurer, 
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake 
County Treasurer; and GRANT L. 
PENDLETON, Tooele County 
Treasurer, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. HAL HANSEN, 
CHAIRMAN OF THE UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION 
Civil tfo. 88-3457 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
ss, 
R. HAL HANSEN, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
and having personal knowledge of the following, deposes and 
testifies as follows: 
1. That I am the duly appointed, qualified and acting 
Chairman of the Utah State Tax Commission. 
2. That I have served as Chairman of the Tax Commission 
during all times relevant to this action. 
3. That the State Tax Commission has been sued in 1982, 
1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1987 by all interstate railroads 
operating within the State of Utah claiming that all local 
commercial and industrial properties are under-assessed. 
4. Article XIII, §11 of the Utah Constitution and Utah 
Code Annotated §59-1-210 charges the State Tax Commission with 
the administration and supervision of the tax laws of the State 
of Utah and governance of county officials in the performance of 
duties relating to assessment, equalization and collection of 
property taxes. 
5. Article XIII of the Constitution of Utah requires 
uniformity and equality of assessment and is the goal towards 
which the Tax Commission exercises its supervision over local 
officials. 
6. Uniform and equal assessment within and among the 
counties are matters of statewide concern in that they affect 
litigation in which the State is a party. 
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7. That I am personally familiar with appraisal and 
reappraisal efforts in the counties of the State and the impact 
of S.B. 151 upon those efforts as reflected by new reappraisal 
programs and the results of sales assessment ratio studies. 
8. That the State Tax Commission endorses S.B. 151 as 
being an extension of the state public purpose of favoring and 
achieving equal and uniform assessments. 
9. That said Act has had a positive impact upon the 
quality of assessment practices and the conformance of assess-
ments to the constitutional mandate of equality and uniformity 
of assessments. 
10. That the State Tax Commission/ through a member of the 
Commission, has testified before the appropriate legislative 
committee and opposed the repeal of the Act. 
11. That the State Tax Commission continues to support the 
Act in that it assists the Tax Commission in the performance of 
its duties as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the State 
of Utah. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this A ^ d a y of September, 1983. 
P: HAL HANSEN, CHAIRMAN 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this X/^day of 
September, 1988, personally appeared be R. Hal Hansen, the 
signer of the foregoing Affidavit, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
BPI:A 
Residing at; J-2S £ ,*££h^/^ 
